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AN OVERVIEW OF ASSIGNMENTS AND SUBLEASES OF 
MINERAL LEASES AND THE MOST-FAVORED NATION 
CLAUSE: HOOVER TREE FARM, L.L.C. V. GOODRICH 
PETROLEUM COMPANY, L.L.C. 
Marion Peter Roy, III* 
Oil and Gas lessees have long assigned and subleased all or 
part of their interests in those leases to third parties. While much 
early Louisiana jurisprudence in the area centered merely on 
identifying the language that distinguishes assignments from 
subleases, and on analyzing the legal effects of that difference, the 
importance of correctly assessing the relationship either between 
lessee and assignee or between lessee and sublessee takes on an 
even more significant meaning when examining the issue through 
the lens of an existing so-called “most-favored nation clause” 
(hereinafter “MFN clause”) in the original oil and gas lease. In the 
fervent rush to secure leasehold acreage in a profitable shale “play” 
(such as the Haynesville shale of North Louisiana, the area at issue 
in this case), many exploration and production (hereinafter E&P) 
companies eventually pay exponentially more both in per-acre 
bonus amounts and royalty percentage amounts in lease 
conveyances than did the original E&P company party to the lease 
as a lessee. Usually, this common form of speculation creates no 
additional payments owed to the lessor. However, as it will be seen 
in the coming discussion of Hoover Tree Farm v. Goodrich 
Petroleum,1 a lease containing an MFN clause serves to place 
liability in solido both on the original lessee and the transferee, 
obliging them together to compensate the lessor the amount in 
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 1. Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 46,153 
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difference between the price of the original lease and that of the 
partial assignment, both in per-acre bonus and royalty percentage 
payments, if in fact the transfer at issue is deemed to be an 
assignment rather than a sublease, or if the two lessees may be 
deemed to be “co-owners” of the lease. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. (“Hoover”) leased 317 acres of land 
in Caddo Parish to Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C. 
(“Goodrich”) in 2008, for whom Petroleo Properties, L.L.C. 
(“Petroleo”) acted as a broker in negotiating the lease. The final 
negotiated terms of the Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease2 granted 
Hoover a 25% royalty and a $1,000 per acre lease bonus.3 After 
early revisions of the MFN clause by Hoover’s attorney, its final 
version, and the source of this case’s litigation, provides as 
follows:  
Lessee and Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C., which 
joins herein, each guarantee that no lessor of either Lessee 
or Goodrich Petroleum or their successors and assigns shall 
receive a higher royalty and/or bonus than the Lessor under 
this Lease. Should any lessor receive such higher bonus 
and/or royalty, the Lessor under this Lease shall receive 
from Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C. the difference 
between the higher bonus and the bonus paid to Lessor at 
the inception of this Lease, and the difference between the 
higher royalty and the royalty paid to Lessor under this 
Lease. This clause will remain in effect separately with 
respect to each Section covered by this Lease, and with 
respect to each such Section, this clause will remain in full 
force and effect until the end of the Primary Term of this 
Lease. This clause covers every lease which may be made 
by Lessee, Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C., Sendero 
                                                                                                             
 2. Id. at 161-62. 
 3. While the lease initially listed Petroleo, L.L.C. as the Lessee, paragraph 
27 of the Lease clearly provides that Goodrich is to be deemed the original 
Lessee since it was always Petroleo’s intent as broker to assign the lease to 
Goodrich. On May 7, 2008, Petroleo assigned to Goodrich “all of the Assignor’s 
right, title and interest” in and to the lease. See Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162, n.4. 
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Resources Incorporated and/or Caddo Resources LP, as 
Lessee, and their respective successors and assigns, in any 
section in any of the following townships and ranges in 
Caddo Parish, Louisiana: (19N–16W), (19N–15W), (18N–
16W), and (18N–15W).4 
On June 6, 2008, Goodrich and Chesapeake Louisiana, LP 
(“Chesapeake”) executed an “Assignment, Conveyance, and Bill 
of Sale,” in which Goodrich “Granted, Sold, Assigned, Conveyed, 
and Delivered” to Chesapeake an undivided 50% interest in the 
Hoover lease and other leases to all depths below the “Cotton 
Valley Formation.” The transfer did not contain any forms of 
payment that resembled an overriding royalty for Goodrich.5 Soon 
after this agreement, Chesapeake acquired other oil and gas leases 
(“third party leases”) in the area within the established bounds of 
the Hoover lease’s MFN clause for a counter-performance of 
$25,000 per acre bonus payments and a 30% lease royalty. Hoover 
then filed suit against Petroleo, Goodrich, and Chesapeake, 
asserting these third party leases triggered application of the MFN 
clause in its own lease. Hoover contended that, because 
Chesapeake was an “assign” of Goodrich and entered into other 
mineral leases in the range covered by the lease’s MFN clause, it 
(Hoover) is owed the difference between the bonus and royalty it 
received initially and the amount of bonus and royalty Chesapeake 
paid for the third party leases. Hoover’s September 28, 2009 
Motion for Summary Judgment sought $7,608,000 (317 acres x 
$24,000) and a 30% royalty. In response, Chesapeake’s and 
Goodrich’s opposing summary judgments asserted the transfer 
between them was a sublease rather than an assignment, thereby 
not triggering the MFN clause. In the alternative, Chesapeake also 
contended that even if the clause would be deemed to come into 
effect, that Goodrich alone would be liable for breach of the 
clause.6 
                                                                                                             
 4. Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162. 
 5. Id. at 162. 
 6. Id. at 163-64. 
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 The trial court, after receiving the arguments from all 
parties, granted Hoover’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding 
that the transfer between Goodrich and Chesapeake was an 
assignment and that the MFN clause’s application would be 
allowed because of Chesapeake’s third party lease acquisitions. 
The court thus increased the Hoover royalty to 30%, denied 
Goodrich’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and granted 
Chesapeake’s summary judgment, holding that Goodrich was the 
only party accountable for the higher bonus under the Hoover 
lease’s MFN clause. Hoover and Goodrich both appealed 
following the judgment; Hoover also sought to hold Chesapeake 
liable along with Goodrich for the $7.6 million judgment in its 
favor.7 
II. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, amended 
the lower court’s judgment, affirming in part and reversing in part, 
holding that Chesapeake was obligated in solido with Goodrich to 
satisfy the higher bonus payment under the most-favored nation 
clause,8 and that the transfer executed between Chesapeake and 
Goodrich was an assignment rather than a sublease.9 Despite the 
court’s recognition of the fact that the case’s primary issue is the 
interpretation of the MFN clause, it nevertheless first addresses the 
issue of the in solido obligation of both Goodrich and Chesapeake 
                                                                                                             
 7. Id. at 164. 
 8. See the block quotation supra for the exact terms of the most-favored 
nation clause at issue in this case. While there are many available published 
attempts to precisely define MFN clauses as they are modernly used, the exact 
definition depends upon the circumstances in which they are employed and the 
type of obligations they modify. A basic MFN clause definition is as follows: “a 
contractual agreement between a buyer and a seller that the price paid by the 
buyer will be at least as low as the price paid by other buyers who purchase the 
same commodities from the seller.” Arnold Celnicker, A Competitive Analysis of 
Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts between Health Care Providers and 
Insurers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 863, 864 (1991). In the instant case, the MFN clause 
provides that the lessor will receive the highest prices paid by other lessees 
within a strictly defined geographic area of mineral exploration. 
 9. Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 181. 
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(with regards to their having to pay the $7.6 million). After briefly 
but clearly noting that mineral leases are real rights governed by 
Louisiana’s Mineral Code,10 the court states that Article 12811 
provides that the assignees or sublessees acquire the rights and 
powers of the original lessee to the extent conveyed by the partial 
assignment or sublease. Noting the lower court’s inconsistency in 
holding that Goodrich alone was liable under the judgment, but 
also somehow holding that both Goodrich and Chesapeake would 
be jointly affected by the lease’s royalty obligation increasing for 
30%, the appellate court rejected the notion that Goodrich is solely 
liable for the payment of the $7.6 million judgment to Hoover. The 
court thus held that since Article 128 makes clear that both 
Goodrich and Chesapeake are co-owners of the lease’s operational 
rights, that both companies are therefore liable for payment to 
Hoover.12 
Regarding the appeal’s principal issue (whether the transfer 
between Goodrich and Chesapeake was an assignment or 
sublease), the court provides a thorough jurisprudential history of 
the long-litigated difference between the two forms of lease 
conveyances, starting with a basic examination of the importance 
of a contract’s interpretation being clear and unambiguous, if 
possible.13 Eventually, the court outlines the Civil Code’s 
definitions for successors and assigns, concluding that within the 
meaning of Civil Code article 3506,14 Chesapeake was an assign of 
Goodrich; however, since the transaction involved a mineral lease, 
the court further examines the unique law and Louisiana 
jurisprudence surrounding subleases and assignments as they 
pertain to mineral leases. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court 
has decided many cases on the issue, the most important cases, and 
                                                                                                             
 10. See, generally, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31 (2012). 
 11. Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 163. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:128 
(2012). 
 12. Hoover, 63 So .3d at 167. 
 13. Id. at 168. 
 14. Id. at 170. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506. 
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the two which this court considers the most,15  are Roberson v. 
Pioneer Gas Co16 and Smith v. Sun Oil.17 Noting the 
inconsistencies in jurisprudence because of a lack of the code’s 
guidance on the issue, the court holds that the “lease upon a lease” 
concept as first presented in Sun Oil became relaxed and 
broadened to mean that the sublease test became “any retained 
measure”—that is, for a sublease to exist, the transferor has to 
retain a “measure,” now commonly called an “override,” of the 
original lease. Importantly, the court states in dicta in footnote 20 
that “we have not uncovered a Louisiana decision where a tenant 
conveyed an undivided interest in his lease and became faced with 
the claim that a sublease had occurred.”18 The court again 
reiterates that in all prior cases involving the transfer of an 
undivided interest in a mineral lease, such as what happened 
between Goodrich and Chesapeake, courts have not found the 
transfers to be subleases.19 Thus, despite both Chesapeake’s and 
Goodrich’s claims that their transfer was a sublease, the court 
holds that “we cannot find that the Transfer from Goodrich to 
Chesapeake was a sublease, causing them to be in a 
sublessor/sublessee relationship.”20  
However, after this thorough legal and jurisprudential 
framework of the assignment vs. sublease realm, the court seems to 
shift entirely to a separate (if related) legal topic—co-ownership. 
Ultimately, despite definitively declaring the transfer as an 
assignment, the court declares “the relationship between Goodrich 
and Chesapeake after the transfer falls squarely within the 
Louisiana Law of co-ownership.”21 Therefore, the assignment of 
the leasehold rights to Chesapeake made it responsible directly to 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. at 175-76. 
 16. Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931). 
 17. Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. 379 (La. 1928). 
 18. Hoover, 65 So. 3d at 176. 
 19. Id. at 177. 
 20. Id. at 179. 
 21. Id.  
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the original lessor, Hoover.22 In the final analysis, the court’s 
holding seems to hinge more on the finding that Chesapeake and 
Goodrich were co-owners of the lease, rather than on the finding 
that Chesapeake was an assignee instead of a sublessee after the 
transfer. Both findings, however, are clearly stated in the reasons 
given by the court.23 
III. COMMENTARY 
This brief commentary will argue that the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals made the correct holding regarding both the MFN 
clause issue and the assignment/sublease issue present in Hoover 
Tree Farm v. Goodrich Petroleum Company, but that it was 
unnecessary, superfluous, and confusing for the court to cite the 
law of co-ownership at the end of its discussion in support of its 
holding. Put simply, the court arrived at the correct holding after it 
accurately concluded that, since Chesapeake was a partial assignee 
in the lease transfer, Chesapeake along with Goodrich were liable 
to Hoover—the court should have concluded the opinion following 
assignment/sublease analysis instead of proceeding to discuss co-
ownership as well. While some of the points of this commentary’s 
straightforward argument are perhaps touched upon in the court’s 
discussion, the argument infra attempts to lay out a simpler, more 
direct means of getting to the same, correct holding(s) as did the 
court in its opinion. 
Article 114 of the Mineral Code provides that “a mineral lease 
is a contract by which the lessee is granted the right to explore for 
and produce minerals.”24 While the Mineral Code makes 
abundantly clear that the mineral lease is notably different than 
most other contracts in that it creates a real right (rather than a 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. at 180. 
 23. Id.  
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:114 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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personal obligation),25 a mineral lease is nevertheless a legally 
effective agreement between parties, regulating rights and 
obligations like any other personal contract.26 Accordingly, the 
interpretation of mineral leases operates exactly like that of any 
other contract: the words used in the lease are to be given their 
prevailing meaning (unless they are words of art or technical),27 
and no further interpretation should be made in search of the 
parties’ intent if the lease’s words are “clear, explicit, and lead to 
no absurd consequences.”28 In this case, the disputed clause in the 
original lease between Hoover and Goodrich, and the initial reason 
for the litigation, is its most-favored nation clause. The first 
sentence of the MFN clause clearly and unambiguously states that 
Goodrich “guarantee[s] that no lessor or lessee of either entity or 
their successors and assigns shall receive a higher royalty and/or 
bonus than the Lessor under this Lease.”29 The concluding 
sentence provides clearly and unambiguously that the clause 
covers every lease within a specified geographic range made by 
Goodrich and their respective successors and assigns.30 If, 
therefore, in conjunction with the language from the above-
mentioned civil code articles discussing contract language 
interpretation, the terms in this MFN clause can be given their 
prevailing meaning, no further interpretation of the clause is 
necessary if that interpretation does not lead to absurd 
consequences. Here, then, if Chesapeake can be deemed an 
“assign” of Goodrich, the MFN is therefore triggered, and 
Chesapeake as an assign would be liable for payment along with 
Goodrich for that guarantee of the difference of bonus and royalty 
amounts to the lessor, Hoover.  
                                                                                                             
 25. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16 (2012). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
31:18 (2012). 
 26. See, generally, Stephenson v Petrohawk Properties, L.P., 37 So. 3d 1145 
(La. App. Ct. 2d 2010); Winnon v Davis 759 So. 2d 321 (La. App. Ct. 2d 2000).  
 27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2047 (2012). 
 28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046 (2012). 
 29. Hoover, 65 So. 3d at 162 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. 
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Determining whether Chesapeake is a partial assignee, and 
therefore liable in solido with Goodrich, or a sublessee, and 
therefore not liable, involves a slightly more complex and involved 
analysis than that of the interpretation of the language of the MFN 
clause. However, it quickly becomes clear after reading the 
Mineral Code, relevant jurisprudence,31 and secondary sources32 
that it is highly unlikely that this transfer between Goodrich and 
Chesapeake would make the latter a sublessee rather than an 
assignee. In the law of mineral leases in Louisiana, a unifying trait 
present in subleases, and not in assignments, is the presence of a 
reservation of an interest of some kind by the original lessee; an 
assignment of a lease, however, is generally viewed merely as a 
kind of sale of all or part of the lease.33 The distinction is well-
established through several decades of the development of 
Louisiana oil and gas law34 and is clearly laid out in this excerpt 
from Leslie Moses’ 1940 law review article on the matter: 
There is a difference under the Louisiana law between an 
assignment and a sublease of an oil and gas lease. An 
assignment is the conveying of all or a part of the entire 
lease for the whole of the unexpired term. The assignee 
secures the same interest that his assignor had at the time of 
                                                                                                             
 31. Mire v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 285 F. Supp. 885, 890 (W.D. La. 1968): 
There is a sharp distinction between an assignment of a lease and a 
sublease, recognized in the jurisprudence. In the case of a sublease a 
new and, in a sense, separate contractual relationship of lease exists 
between the original lessee and the sublessee. There can be no actions 
on the contract between the original lessor and the sublessee because 
there is no privity between them; there are two contracts, the original 
lease and the sublease, only the original lessee is a party to both… 
Where there is an assignment of the lease…the assignee is liable to the 
original lessor for the obligations of the original lessee which he has 
assumed completely. To sublease is to lease in whole or in part the 
thing of which one is the lessee, with reservation of an interest in it by 
the original lessee, or sublessor; while to assign a lease is to sell it 
(emphasis added). 
 32. See generally Leslie Moses, The Distinction between a Sublease and an 
Assignment of a Mineral Lease in Louisiana, 18 TEX. L. REV. 159 (1940). 
 33. See the emphasized portion of the quotation, supra note 31.  
 34. See Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust, 91 So. 2d 762 (La. 1956); see also 
Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931); Smith v. Sun Oil 
Company, 116 So. 379 (La. 1928). 
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the assignment. Any instrument transferring less than this, 
or a part of lessee's rights or obligations under the original 
lease, is a sublease. 
In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary a sublease, or an underlease, 
is defined as: “An alienation by a tenant of a part of his 
lease, reserving to himself a reversion; it differs from an 
assignment which is a transfer of all the tenant's interest in 
the lease. And even a conveyance of the whole estate by the 
lessee, reserving to himself the rent, with a power of 
reentry for nonpayment, was held to be not an assignment 
but an underlease.”35 
In the instant case, the transfer between Goodrich and 
Chesapeake was an assignment, rather than a sublease, because the 
terms of the transfer were such that Chesapeake received “an 
undivided 50% interest in the Lease . . . as to all depths below the 
Cotton Valley formation. The Transfer contained no provisions for 
payment to Goodrich in the nature of an overriding royalty.”36 
Nothing about this transfer mirrors the mechanisms of a sublease, 
or an “underlease” (to use the original civilian term), since 
Goodrich reserved no interest or overriding royalty, as made clear 
in the court’s observation quoted immediately above. Rather, this 
is an assignment in which the conveyance is of “all or a part of the 
entire lease for the whole of the unexpired term”37—in this partial 
assignment, the lessee transferred all the rights associated with half 
of the lease’s interest. Indeed, the assignee (Chesapeake) has 
secured “the same interest that his assignor had at the time of the 
assignment.”38  
 Thus, Chesapeake, as an assignee rather than sublessee, 
should be held liable in solido with Goodrich for both the $7.6 
million judgment and the higher royalty amount. The MFN clause, 
read clearly and unambiguously as the language in any mineral 
lease should be, was triggered when Goodrich executed the 50% 
partial assignment to Chesapeake. According to Mineral Code 
                                                                                                             
 35. Moses, supra note 32, at 159-60 (citations omitted).  
 36. Hoover, 63 So. 3d at 162. 
 37. Moses, supra note 32, at 159. 
 38. Id.  
 
 
2013] HOOVER TREE FARM V. GOODRICH 325 
 
Article 128, the partial assignee (Chesapeake) is directly 
responsible to the lessor (Hoover). The Second Circuit thus 
correctly held that Hoover shall recover from both Goodrich and 
Chesapeake. The opinion, however, could have ended after the 
court’s conclusion that Chesapeake is an assignee. By adding at the 
end of its analysis that Chesapeake and Goodrich were co-owners 
of the lease, and therefore liable in solido for that reason as well, 
the Court is opening another can of worms: though the Mineral 
Code provides that mineral rights are real rights, can one “own” 
these rights, and therefore be co-owner of them? It is good news 
that the case could be solved without answering to this tricky 
question.  
 
 
